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The (Continued) Assault on Privacy:  
A Timely Book Review Forty Years in 
the Making 
or many of us, the name “Arthur Miller” instantly brings us back 
to the long law school nights spent cuddling up with our favorite 
civil procedure textbook.  For others, it conjures up images of 
Miller’s media persona, from Miller’s Court to Court TV to Good 
Morning America.  And, for the unfortunate few, mere mention of the 
name triggers anew the terror struck into their hearts the moment they 
spotted the venerable practitioner at opposing counsel’s table or on 
the signatory line of a response brief.  Throughout the years, Miller 
has been a prolific and engaged teacher, academic, celebrity and 
advocate, making invaluable contributions to legal discourse and the 
practice of law.  And today, as many of Miller’s colleagues and 
admirers comment on his enviable body of work, we have selected 
but one to celebrate the occasion—a work that has not only endured 
the test of time, but embraced it. 
The year was 1971.  Nixon was president, Patton won the 
Academy Award, and gas was 36 cents a gallon.  And, while many of 
us were squandering our time making celebrity appearances on The 
Dating Game or waiting to be born, the one and only Arthur Miller 
was carefully crafting scholarship considering the grave implications 
the computer would have on modern conceptions of personal privacy.  
 
* Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
† His former law clerk, now a litigation associate in the San Diego office of Latham and 
Watkins LLP. 
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And so The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and 
Dossiers1 was born. 
Why this book?  Because in a world of Twitter and Facebook 
where few things—save canned peas and British royalty—have a 
shelf life beyond the nanosecond of their conception, The Assault on 
Privacy has proved to be a seminal masterpiece in privacy for the 
twentieth century and beyond.  Penned at the dawn of the computer 
age, the book ably grapples with the dangers presented by the 
accumulation and centralization of personal information in official 
and private databases.2  The efforts of these “data-maniacs”—those 
individuals who can’t “perceiv[e] anything but the intrinsic value of 
data” and will stop at nothing to amass it—Miller forewarned, pose a 
dire threat to the “informational privacy” of the person whose 
information is sought to be extracted, dissected, stored, disseminated 
or otherwise used.3 
Chapter by chapter, the book lucidly details the direct threats to 
privacy in the early digital age, from the “murky business” of the 
credit bureaus collecting and selling information about millions of 
Americans;4 to the aggressive and relentless efforts of administrative 
agencies to “extract more and more facts about the American 
citizenry”5 by way of diagnostics, questionnaires and surveys; to the 
federal government’s push for a crime-fighting “National Data 
Center.”6 
Importantly, the threat Miller so clearly articulates isn’t merely that 
information will be wrongfully disseminated or otherwise misused—
though that risk is thoughtfully addressed as well—but the more 
immediate danger to the “individual’s ability to control the circulation 
of information relating to him,” which is threatened by the testing, 
surveying, storing and centralizing itself.7  As Miller eloquently 
explains, “when an individual is deprived of control over the spigot 
that governs the flow of information pertaining to him, in some 
measure he becomes subservient to those people and institutions that 
 
1 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND 
DOSSIERS (1971). 
2 See id. 
3 Id. at 22–23. 
4 Id. at 69. 
5 Id. at 128 (quoting 115 CONG. REC. H859 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1969) (statement of Rep. 
Betts)). 
6 Id. at 54–67. 
7 Id. at 25. 
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are able to manipulate it.”8  And while the danger of hackers and 
fraudsters hovers continuously on the horizon, it is this “intrinsically 
valuable aspect[] of individual privacy”9 that remains most fragile as 
we have moved seamlessly from machine-readable punch cards to 
computing in a cloud. 
Nowadays, of course, we’re all so inured to the idea of being 
surveyed, observed, scrutinized, poked and prodded that one might 
wonder how such antiquated notions of “privacy” are possibly 
applicable to our goldfish-bowl society.  Indeed, Miller himself 
anticipated “that the growing omnipresence of the computer may have 
a numbing effect on the . . . values subsumed under the heading 
‘personal privacy.’”10  And his prediction was surely borne out:  In a 
world where people proudly blog about their sexual exploits11 and 
plastic surgeries,12 it’s hard to imagine being seriously offended by 
such benign inquiries as a census question asking whether you have a 
clothes dryer in your home.13  But our desensitization has only gone 
so far, and, at least as to those narrow categories of our own lives we 
still hold private, we must heed Miller’s warning and remain most 
vigilant against the government’s veracious appetite for 
information—lest the data-maniacs run wild over the few civil 
liberties we have left. 
Our National DNA Database is a case in point.  The tale begins in 
2000, when Congress first required federal law enforcement officers 
to extract DNA samples from those convicted of serious federal 
crimes—murder, rape, etc.—for preservation in a revolutionary new 
database called the Combined DNA Index System or CODIS.14  
States could also deposit offender DNA into the data bank to be 
compared and exchanged with samples collected from all over the 
nation.  Almost immediately, the database proved useful in solving 
cold crimes and new cases alike, and Congress never looked back. 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 23. 
10 Id. at 53. 
11 See Jeffrey Rosen, Your Blog or Mine?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 19, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/19/magazine/19PHENOM.html. 
12 See, e.g., Meet the Girls: Popular Ladies Blogs, MYFREEIMPLANTS.COM, http://My 
FreeImplants.com/meet-the-girls/ladies-blogs (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
13 See MILLER, supra note 1, at 127. 
14 See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a) (2000).  
See generally United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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Succumbing to, as Miller calls it, “the hypnotic attraction for 
electronic record-keeping,”15 Congress soon amended the law to 
collect and preserve DNA from anyone convicted of any felony,16 
and, just two years after that, again expanded the Act to cover 
arrestees and immigration detainees.17  States eagerly followed suit, 
rapidly expanding the reach of their DNA swabs to arrestees, 
misdemeanants, even juveniles.18  Today, just twelve short years after 
its initial conception, CODIS holds the DNA of over ten million 
individuals, including over 139,000 from Oregon alone.19  If the 
government’s insatiable demand for DNA continues, we will all find 
ourselves in the DNA database sooner or later. 
Indeed, the government may not even need the DNA of each and 
every one of us, since familial matching means DNA can identify not 
only the suspect, but the relatives of the suspect as well.20  Nor is the 
use of the DNA database necessarily limited to identification 
purposes.  Given that we leave a trail of genetic bread crumbs 
everywhere we go, DNA can be collected to reconstruct where we’ve 
been and who we were with.  Moreover, the DNA sample itself has 
the potential to reveal massive amounts of personal information 
including our sex, race, genetic defects, behavioral propensities, 
predisposition to disease and perhaps even sexual orientation.21 
Though the privacy implications may be too obvious to overlook 
today, Miller foresaw the seductive danger of a centralized, universal 
 
15 MILLER, supra note 1, at 4. 
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d) (2004). 
17 See Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2006). 
18 See Ju-Hyun Yoo, Note, The Science of Identifying People by Their DNA, A Powerful 
Tool for Solving Crimes, Including Cold Cases from the Civil Rights Era, 22 SYRACUSE 
SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 53, 60 (2010) (noting that, as of 2009, “twenty-eight states collect 
DNA from juvenile offenders, nine collect DNA from those convicted of certain 
misdemeanors, and fifteen from arrestees”). 
19 See CODIS–NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov 
/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics#Army (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
20 See Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for 
One Purpose Is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1317 (2011). 
21 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Reinhardt, 
J., dissenting).  Judge Gould made this connection as well:  “In our age in which databases 
can be ‘mined’ in a millisecond using super-fast computers, in which extensive 
information can, or potentially could, be gleaned from DNA (even the ‘junk’ DNA 
currently used), and in which this data can easily be stored and shared by governments and 
private parties worldwide, the threat of a loss of privacy is real, even if we cannot yet 
discern the full scope of the problem.  A related concern was voiced more than two 
decades ago, long before the advent of DNA profiling.  See generally Arthur R. Miller, 
The Assault on Privacy 24–54 (1971).”  Id. at 842 (Gould, J., concurring). 
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data bank four decades sooner.  The issue of the day was universal 
fingerprinting, but the fundamental threat remains the same: 
 It is axiomatic that the power the government can acquire 
through widespread surveillance or information control might be 
used to constrict individual freedom and that pressures in that 
direction must be resisted.  Arguments or supplications couched in 
terms of governmental economy or administrative efficiency cannot 
justify every bureaucratic demand for greater power to extract, 
manipulate, store, and disseminate personal data . . . .  Unless we 
maintain our vigilance against today’s pressures, we may find 
ourselves confronted by something akin to the Chinese Communist 
Party’s program to register and monitor every household in 
China.22 
Thus, although universal fingerprinting may have gone out of style 
along with purple velour trousers and disco music, the need to 
zealously guard against the threats posed by advancing technology—
and those who aren’t afraid to use it—has not. 
This is not to deny that there are benefits to the digitization of even 
very private information.  As Miller repeatedly acknowledges, “the 
new information technology has enormous long-range beneficial 
consequences for society”23—benefits that we have earned and are 
entitled to enjoy.  Thus, the question becomes not how to limit or 
eradicate this intrusive technology, but how to “strike a balance 
between the rights of the individual and the need for societal 
efficiency.”24  Under this framework, the only real danger lies in the 
temptation to embrace new technology with such vigor that privacy 
considerations are relegated to footnote status or eliminated 
altogether. 
Today’s pedal-to-the-metal push for the adoption of electronic 
medical records illustrates precisely this concern.  Most of us still 
consider our medical records private.  It’s really nobody’s business, 
after all, that you’ve been diagnosed with erectile dysfunction or 
suffer from hemorrhoids.  Yet Miller recognizes the upside of storing 
such records in a central, electronic location:  “[I]f a person falls ill 
while away from home, a local doctor could use the patient’s birth 
number to retrieve his medical history and drug reactions from a 
central medical data bank.”25  And four decades later, it was with 
 
22 MILLER, supra note 1, at 205. 
23 Id. at 7–8. 
24 Id. at 239. 
25 Id. at 4. 
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these very goals in mind that Congress enacted legislation requiring 
all medical records to be digitized by 2014.26 
But admirable as these goals may be, not enough attention has been 
paid to the confidentiality and security of such personal information.  
Indeed, the very features that make the policy useful—the 
centralization and immediate accessibility of the data bank—also 
increase by orders of magnitude the number of people who can gain 
access to the confidential information.  Accordingly, the danger of 
computer-savvy hackers, conventional thieves and good-old-
fashioned nosy neighbors gaining illicit access to our records takes on 
urgent significance in the digital age. 
Experience with electronic medical records at the state and local 
levels confirms the legitimacy of these fears.  In 2009 a hacker 
demanded $10 million ransom from Virginia after breaking into its 
state-run drug abuse database and stealing 8.3 million patient 
records.27  And in 2010 a Bronx thief stole 1.7 million electronic 
health files from an unlocked record management company’s van.28  
The numbers speak for themselves:  The federal government’s “Wall 
of Shame”—a Department of Health and Human Services 
compilation of security breaches affecting more than 500 patients—
lists over 300 hospitals, insurance companies and health care 
professionals reporting such privacy breaches in the past two years 
alone.29 
There are the curious to worry about as well.  As Miller 
recognized, “many of us are congenital gossipers[ who] show a 
prurient interest in the details and misfortunes in the lives of 
others.”30  But the curious cat in all of us has had serious 
 
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(7)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also Obama 
Pledges Electronic Medical Records for Everyone Within Five Years, DIABETES HEALTH 
(Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.diabeteshealth.com/read/2009/01/19/6053/obama-pledges       
-electronic-medical-records-for-everyone-within-five-years. 
27 Brian Krebs, Hackers Break into Virginia Health Professions Database, Demand 
Ransom, WASH. POST (May 4, 2009), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009 
/05/hackers_break_into_virginia_he.html. 
28 See N.Y.C. Health and Hosps. Corp., Press Release: HHC Reports Theft of Personal 
Health Information, NYC.GOV (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hhc/html 
/pressroom/pr-20110211-data-theft.shtml. 
29 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Breaches Affecting 500 or More Individuals, 
HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule 
/breachtool.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012); see also Milt Fruedenheim, Breaches Lead to 
Push to Protect Medical Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/05/31/business/31privacy.html?_r=1&ref=business&pagewanted=all. 
30 MILLER, supra note 1, at 47. 
KOZINSKI 3/9/2012  2:39 PM 
2012] The (Continued) Assault on Privacy: A Timely Book Review 1141 
Forty Years in the Making 
repercussions for medical privacy:  In 2008, UCLA fired over a dozen 
employees for unauthorized snooping into Britney Spears’s medical 
records after she was admitted for psychiatric problems, even though 
the hospital sent an email the morning she arrived reminding 
employees that they weren’t permitted to peruse records unless caring 
directly for a patient.31  The hospital was confronted with the same 
issue just months earlier, when it was revealed that an administrative 
specialist “accessed [Farah Fawcett’s] records more often than her 
own doctors” and sold news of her cancer relapse to tabloids for 
$4600.32  Though gossip and the bribery used to obtain it are age-old 
predicaments, the temptation to sneak a peek will loom ever larger 
once health employees across the United States come to realize that a 
few clicks of a mouse can reveal intimate details on neighbors, 
celebrities and teenage-daughters’ boyfriends alike. 
Congress has taken a rather nonchalant attitude towards privacy.  
There are no provisions, for example, requiring patient data to be 
encrypted, meaning that a misplaced laptop or thumb drive could 
easily lead to the public disclosure of thousands of medical files.33  
And a recent audit by the Department of Health and Human Services 
of seven hospitals revealed gaping security issues, ranging from 
“inadequate password settings [and] computers that did not log users 
off after periods of inactivity” to a “data backup room[ whose] back 
door lock had been taped over.”34  Although a pending regulation 
could give patients the right to see who has viewed their medical 
record after the fact,35 there are no requirements that the patient be 
notified, much less consent, before his data is handed over to a third 
 
31 Charles Ornstein, Hospital to Punish Snooping on Spears, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/15/local/me-britney15. 
32 Charles Ornstein, Farrah Fawcett: ‘Under a Microscope’ and Holding onto Hope, 
L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/la-et-fawcett-interview11-
2009may11,0,3538939.story. 
33 See Electronic Medical Records Rarely Encrypted: Expert, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/electronic-medical-records    
-encrypted-data-breach_n_1086129.html. 
34 DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONWIDE 
ROLLUP REVIEW OF THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES HEALTH 
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 OVERSIGHT 3, 6–7 (May 
16, 2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region4/40805069.pdf. 
35 See Kelly Kennedy, Greater Patient Access to Records Proposed, USA TODAY (June 
9, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-06-09-patient-health-records 
_n.htm. 
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party.36  By pressing relentlessly towards digitization without 
considering the consequences for personal privacy, Congress is 
shirking its duty to truly engage in the deliberative process, and, 
ultimately, to ensure that privacy protections are in place before all of 
our sensitive information is uploaded to the medical community at 
large.  Its failure to do so is yet another clear symptom of the data-
mania Miller diagnosed almost a half century ago. 
Yet another area where Miller’s predictions have been borne out is 
with regard to data sharing as Big Business.  Miller’s warning that 
“[w]e must begin to realize what it means to live in a society that 
treats information as an economically desirable commodity and a 
source of power”37 is more true today than ever:  Knowledge may be 
power, but information is money. 
To a certain extent, we’ve accepted the fact that there is a booming 
market in our personal data.  At this point, we’ve all grown 
complacent to the constant bombardment of tracking cookies and 
targeted pop-ups that seem a bit too keen on our Internet excursions.  
Even the coupons printed on our grocery store receipts—perhaps $1 
off Midol and buy one, get one free Dove chocolates—seem creepily 
one step ahead of next week’s anticipated purchases. 
What we may be less aware of, however, is how our own 
government has figured into the equation.  As Miller notes, 
government investigators and local law enforcement have always 
been avid consumers in the marketplace of information, at least as 
loyal customers of the credit bureaus.38  And, as the information 
economy has expanded, so too have the government’s purse strings.  
Verizon, for instance, has admitted that it “receives tens of thousands 
of requests for customer records, or other customer information from 
law enforcement” each year.39  Facebook gets ten to twenty police 
requests a day.40  And the information doesn’t come cheap:  Cox 
Communications, the third-largest cable provider in the United States, 
 
36 See MILLER, supra note 1, at 86–88 (describing similar shortcomings of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act). 
37 Id. at 23. 
38 See id. at 83. 
39 See Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight, 
SLIGHT PARANOIA (Dec. 1, 2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-reasons   
-for-real-surveillance.html (quoting letter from Todd S. Schulman, Assistant Gen. 
Counsel, Verizon, to Arleta D. Cunningham, Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S. Marshals Serv. 
(Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://files.cloudprivacy.net/verizon-price-list-letter.PDF). 
40 Nick Summers, Walking the Cyberbeat, NEWSWEEK (April 30, 2009), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/04/30/walking-the-cyberbeat.html. 
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for example, charges law enforcement anywhere from $40 for basic 
information, including identifying individuals based on IP address, to 
$3500 for 30 days of wiretapping.41 
Government is also a major patron of the commercial data brokers, 
which have all but replaced the credit bureaus as the government’s 
go-to source for information.  Such firms quietly collect massive 
quantities of personal information on individuals and then sell the 
data to corporations, attorneys, insurers, employers, collection 
agencies, news media and, you guessed it, the government.  In 2005, 
for example, four government agencies—the Department of Justice, 
State Department, Department of Homeland Security and the Social 
Security Administration—spent $30 million on information from data 
brokers.42  And ChoicePoint, one of the largest data-collection firms, 
had “multimillion dollar contracts with at least thirty-five federal 
agencies, including the [IRS] and the FBI.”43  Today, there are 
databases containing trillions of records on virtually every American, 
available for easy perusal by law enforcement everywhere.44  The 
growing omnipresence of the data brokers is particularly 
disconcerting given that the industry is still largely unregulated, 
meaning that government officials can use the firms to avoid privacy 
protection laws that would limit their ability to gather and share the 
information themselves.45  As a result, any efforts to cabin Big 
Brother’s watchful eye would be incomplete without extending such 
efforts to “Big Brother’s Little Helpers”46 as well. 
Nor is the government’s role limited to that of a hungry consumer.  
As Miller explains, our trusted government officials have a long 
 
41 Notice to Parties Serving Subpoenas on Cox Communications, COX COMMC’NS, 
http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/policies/lea-information.cox (last visited Mar. 7, 2012). 
42 See Jayni Foley, Note, Are Google Searches Private? An Originalist Interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 
447 n.5 (2007). 
43 Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 363 (2006). 
44 See Ann Woolner, Ex-Drug Smuggler Turned Data Miner Reclaims Field He 
Created, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com 
/news/2011-09-15/ex-drug-smuggler-turned-data-miner-reclaims-field-he-created.html. 
45 See Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging 
of Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 581 n.80 (2008). 
46 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004). 
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history of “vending information about us behind our backs.”47  State 
departments of motor vehicles, for example, have been selling out car 
owners for just about as long as there have been cars, just as the 
Federal Aviation Administration has sold lists of airline pilots, and 
the IRS has sold aggregate statistics about taxpayers to direct-target 
advertisers.48 
As Miller accurately predicted, the gravy train hasn’t stopped yet:  
States continue to make millions selling personal information of 
drivers stored in their Department of Motor Vehicles databases,49 and 
universities have cashed in by “selling student mailing lists to banks 
and credit card companies.”50  Indeed, some K-12 public schools 
have been all too eager to milk the informational cash cow, offering 
to distribute surveys by businesses to their students—for a fee.51  
Although there has been some federal legislation that attempts to curb 
these abuses,52 the laws are riddled with exceptions.  The Driver’s 
Privacy Protection Act, for example, purports to protect private 
information, but has more than a dozen exceptions, including 
allowing disclosures to other agencies, private investigators and those 
conducting market research.53  Legislation or not, cash-strapped 
schools, agencies and local governments will continue to find a way 
to profit from peddling their informational wares, as they always 
have. 
So where does all this leave us?  Should we throw our hands up to 
the futility of it all and quietly accept our fate?  Certainly not.  
Although, as Miller explained, the law has been “laggard in coming to 
grips with the broader ramifications of the computer,” we must 
counteract the sheer momentum of rapidly advancing technology by 
devoting our “human resources to help solve the difficult problem of 
 
47 See MILLER, supra note 1, at 82. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., John Estus et al., Oklahoma Brings in Millions by Selling Personal Data, 
NEWSOK (Apr. 5, 2010), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-brings-in-millions-by-selling          
-personal-data/article/3451253. 
50 Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Century: Failure to Effectively 
Regulate Privacy for All Students, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 100 & n.238 (2008). 
51 See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1823 (2011). 
52 See, e.g., Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2006); 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006 & Supp. 
2011); see also Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h (2006). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 2721. 
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balancing privacy and efficiency.”54  If we can strike this balance, or 
at least take seriously the need to do so, there may yet be hope for the 
“personal privacy [that] is fundamental to our democratic tradition of 
individual autonomy.”55 
This advice could not be more timely.  It is exceedingly rare for a 
book, particularly one about computers, to be as relevant four decades 
after its publication as the date it was written.  Its continued relevance 
stands testament to the fact that although technology may change 
dramatically—from universal fingerprinting to DNA databases and 
credit bureaus to data brokers—our fundamental notions of privacy 
and the need to balance such concerns with the demands of the 
modern state do not.  It also stands testament to the wisdom of the 
author.  Although we have largely ignored Miller’s cautionary words 
so far, there is still time to lay claim to the precious private spheres 
that remain.  And we must.  If we don’t stand up to the data-maniacs 
today, we may soon find ourselves bowing to the “dossier 
dictatorship” of tomorrow. 
The Assault on Privacy is thus not simply a well-documented 
snapshot of the challenges facing society at the dawn of the computer 
era, but a shrewd and continuing reminder of the perennial issues we 
must confront in an ever-evolving, technologically-driven society; its 
author, in turn, is not merely a prolific and engaged teacher, 
academic, celebrity and advocate, but a prophet in his own time. 
 
54 MILLER, supra note 1, at 259. 
55 Id. 
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